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TENSIONS BETWEEN EVANGELICAL PROTESTANTS IN THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION AND AMERICA SINCE 1989 - A REFLECTIVE COMMENTARY
by Walter Sawatsky
Co-Editor of REE since 1996, Walter Sawatsky is Professor of Church
History and Mission at Associated Mennonite Biblical Seminary in Elkhart
IN, USA, and a part time east/west consultant to Mennonite Central
Committee.
The relationship between Evangelical Christianity in America and the USSR was
always strained and filled with ambiguities. In the first place, whereas Evangelicalism around
the world is often seen as the fruit of the Anglo-American missionary activism of the past 150
years, that is not really the case for Evangelicals in Euro-Asia. Slavic evangelicalism emerged
as a renewal movement, a grass roots Bible movement, out of the context of an Orthodoxy in
crisis in the mid-nineteenth century. It quickly found its peers among similar movements in
Germany and Britain that were new denominational expressions of Pietist renewal among
west European Protestant and Catholic societies. But the Slavic evangelical movement spread
more rapidly in the 20th century, before and after the Russian Revolution, similar now to the
expansion of American Evangelicalism across its continent.
The idea flow from America to Russia was facilitated by Russian and other Slavic
immigrants to America who began reverse missions to Russia. By 1929, virtually all such
contacts had broken off. Resumption of relations after 1956 were first of all through the
Baptist World Alliance (BWA) (whose headquarters had moved to Washington DC from
Britain), some theological study by Russians at Spurgeon’s College and soon also
participation in conferences of the Christian Peace Conference (Prague) and the World
Council of Churches (WCC). On the other hand, an influential wing of American
Evangelicalism began supporting underground Bible smuggling for an underground church,
especially during the 1970s and denounced the leadership of the by then officially recognized
Baptist Union in Moscow.
In rather short order after 1989, the wide network of relationships between the Soviet
Baptist Union and the ecumenical structures of the WCC, of the BWA and other sister
denominational bodies such as the World Pentecostal Congress and Mennonite World
Conference had ended. A new leadership group within the post-Soviet national Baptist
unions, lacking experience in such ecumenical relations, now became part of many, but
1For a more detailed treatment, see this author’s “The Re-Positioning of Evangelical Christians-Baptists and
Sister Church Unions between 1980 and 2005" in Sharyl Corrado & Toivo Pilli, eds. East European Baptist History:
New Perspectives. (Prague: International Baptist Theological Seminary, 2007) 187-209.
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rapidly shifting partnerships with Evangelical organizations that till recently had attacked
them, but who were now offering cash and missionaries to effect the quick conversion of
Russia for Christ. Rarely were these arrangements decided at a union level, mostly they were
survival strategies by enterprising individual pastors and leaders, persuading others to join
them.1
Some of those patterns of relationship are the subject of this reflective commentary.
It is organized around three groups of topics - the main trajectories of global Christianity
since 1988, the variety of Slavic Evangelical attempts at inter-church alliances, and the
American factor.
What Happened to Global Christianity since 1988?
Let us begin with the former Soviet Union. Initially there appeared to be a quite
amazing phenomenon of Russians from all walks of life seeking Christian faith. The
desperate demand for more Bibles was filled within a few years, then the Bibles sat on the
shelves as elsewhere in the West. Priests and pastors were busy baptizing, and lecturing to
any number of groups from university study centers to factory workers. The Orthodox tripled
the number of churches opened, Evangelical statistics suggested similar growth patterns.
Then came the economic collapse, and the turn from looking to the West, especially
to Christian America for the post-Communist fix. There was the rise of nationalist
xenophobia, mounting pressures to reverse the freedoms of religion established in the law on
religion of 1990, and since 1997, not only were significant measures to curtail missionary
work incorporated in the revised legislation on religion (in Russia), but rules for granting
visas continue to tighten up.
We need to be reminded of another major development that also affected the
churches deeply. With the break up of the Soviet Union, there emerged not only 15
independent countries, but the church bodies were also structurally nationalized. The issues
that emerged have still not been resolved. Autocephally and autonomy of Orthodox churches
in Ukraine and Belarus are not yet clarified, relationships to Armenian and Georgian
churches are more strained than earlier, and, at a more serious level, there are numerous
alternative church structures that have formed within Orthodoxy. The Evangelicals had an
2The forced union of Evangelical Christians, Baptists, Pentecostals and later Mennonites to form the legally
recognized All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian-Baptists (AUSCECB), had by 1988 resulted in the fusion of
the first two and the departure of Pentecostals and Mennonites into their own structures. Thus in Russian shorthand,
what outsiders lumped under “Baptist”, the insiders regularly referred to as ECB.
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All-Union structure that needed to be revised after 1990. They organized a Euro-Asiatic
Federation of ECB Unions2 and envisioned a rotating leadership to avoid national
preferences. But the structure, as I have discussed more extensively elsewhere, lacked budget
and authority. In effect, the national unions struggled to survive; some are still struggling.
Soviet Orthodox and Soviet Evangelical leaders had exercised a leadership role with
their counterparts across eastern Europe. That quickly ended. Indeed, the frequency of
intercourse between leaders dropped drastically due to financial strictures. Further, the
agenda for finding their way in the emerging post Communist civil societies differed widely.
Finally in the short space of a mere 15 years, post Communist societies had shifted
from representing the new missionary challenge to becoming one of the more resolutely
secular and post Christian parts of the world. This is not the end of that story, surely, but for
our purposes, what matters is that where Russia and East Europe had seemed to promise the
renewal of mission, one which might help America in particular overcome its spreading
pessimism about cross cultural mission, by the early part of the 21st century the post
Communist world had been pushed to the margins.
So in restating the question - what happened to global Christianity since 1988? -
when we note the major trends globally speaking, it turns out that the long Soviet era may
have mattered more. During the 20th century, the ecumenical century, the Christian traditions
re-discovered each other. It was the most remarkable overcoming of the deep rifts since the
Reformation of the 16th century, not an overcoming of the structural divisions and the
distinctiveness that each Protestant body had developed, but a spreading readiness to make
room in the telling of the story, for what other Reformation traditions were trying to do. This
was a process characterized by a Euro-Atlantic rapprochement. That is, to take the WCC
example, the assemblies and the major work of the committees (especially Faith and Order)
from 1948 through 1961 involved mainly Americans and west Europeans. The Orthodox
world did not become seriously involved till the assembly in New Delhi in 1961, and in terms
of having bloc influence in decision making or blocking, that did not really happen till after
Canberra. My point is that the fundamental patterns of inter-church relations were established
by persons from the Euro-Atlantic axis.
3The reference is to Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom. The Coming of Global Christianity. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002. A standard survey of “moving south” is Dana L. Robert, "Shifting Southward: Global
Christianity since 1945." International Bulletin of Missionary Research (2000): 50-58.
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During that time, the eastern European and the Soviet churches were experiencing
isolation. First in the Soviet sphere, when by at least 1929, all religious bodies were separated
from the state and lost entitlements. All of them had been forced to become free churches,
and, although they suffered losses from very hostile state actions to free citizens from the
clutches of clergy, all the confessional bodies were able to function as free churches. They
had become post-Constantinian churches much more so, than was true in the western part of
Europe, where post Christendom talk became more trendy in the last third of the century.
Largely missing from the story was serious discussion among church leaders about the
ecclesial implications. Those organizations, such as the worker priests associations, or the
Christian peace entities nationally, who were seeking to find a place for Christianity under
socialism, were distrusted then. Since the communist collapse all such individuals and
organizations were quickly dismissed to the dust bin of history, and theological discourse
about church and society seemed to be reverting to some pre-communist era. That is, if we
think of the WCC shifting to church and society themes in 1968 and thereby paying ever
more attention to justice, peace and even ecological themes as third world leaders began to
find their place in global leadership, once again the second world was bringing up the rear.
At the beginning of the 21st century, Jenkins’ hyperbolic book about the Next
Christendom, became a best seller and the general public began to repeat the refrain that
Christianity had moved south3. The majority of Christians were living in the southern
hemisphere, the major demographic shift for Christianity in the 20th century, and soon the
religious centers would no longer be in America, Rome or Geneva, or even in Colorado
Springs. The challenge to rethink many things from a southern perspective is still in its
preliminary stages, western theologians rethink their verities grudgingly at best, but what has
emerged so far is mostly a rearrangement of western ways of thinking.
Since my eventual goal is to comment on the prospect of American capability to be
reconcilers for the east European inter-church conflicts, this broad survey forces one to notice
more intensely why reconciliation is so fundamental to ecumenism. Eastern and western
Christianity had grown apart long before 1054. Linguistically the Orthodox spoke Greek and
the western Roman church spoke Latin. Between about 700 and 1400 yet another linguistic
shift had taken place, where the new large Orthodox communions spoke Slavic and the
4Groupe des Dombes. For the Conversion of the Churches. New York: World Council of Churches, 1993.
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western church was Germanicized. Both Georges Florovsky and Alexander Schmemann
wrote eloquently about the tragedy that Christians from east and west no longer cared that the
relationship was over. To recover a caring sense of God’s church as the whole Oekumene
requires a sustained process of reconciliation. Reconciliation makes sense when repentance
and conversion happen, as in the meaning of conversion of the churches used by the French
ecumenical group, Groupes des Dombes.4 Being reconcilers does not make sense if the
reconciling mediator is not part of the exercise in remembering, repenting and forgiving, a
point I realize, many in my own peace making tradition appear not to grasp.
Russian Evangelical Attempts at Alliance Building
At a gathering of historians of Slavic evangelical history, I developed in more detail
the patterns of re-positioning for leadership since 1988, so I will offer only a few highlights.
One of the most persistent themes in Slavic evangelical history, strikingly so to younger
Russian scholars, was the emphasis on unity. It is striking because the story lines are most
readily organized around major conflicts and splits. The reason why the divisions troubled all
parties so much, had to do with their realization that internal conflict undercut their public
witness. The reality of national and ethnic identities should be respected, was an oft repeated
refrain, but Evangelical Christianity was international, was fundamentally transnational.
There were new efforts at inter-church relationship building following 1989. One
early idea was to buy a building opposite the central Baptist church in Moscow as an
interchurch center - it would enable other evangelical Protestant groups to come together,
western representatives would share a common office and their entire contribution to the new
mission thrust was to be cooperative. By the time the authorities had sorted out whether the
USSR, Russia, Moscow, or the local district owned the building, years had passed. One
initiative was an attempt by the Peter Deyneka organization to establish an Evangelical
Association whose purpose was to mediate the process of church registrations, and to secure
recognition of denominations after the 1997 legal revisions. By then too, Deyneka’s
Vozrozhdenie organization had established hundreds of congregations in the Caucasus region
and some south Ukrainian provinces that turned out to be a distinct denomination.
Several new Evangelical denominations emerged, that were more indigenous in
origin and character initially, later increasingly beholden to support from the North American
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evangelical Christian and Missionary Alliance. Many leaders were sons of Baptist pastors,
impatient to be more culturally adept to the new settings than was the ECB union forged
under Soviet conditions. Others were well educated new converts. Together they sought a
contemporary church style, appreciative of the best of Orthodoxy, and missionary in more
than salvationist categories. Their efforts at bringing all the different groups together under an
Evangelical Missionary Association, have so far resulted mainly in structured links between
similar groups from Krasnodar, Rovno and Kiev.
Another more successful inter-church initiative has been the Euro-Asiatic
Accrediting Association (EAAA). The desire to offer broadly recognized theological degrees
continues to drive the effort not only to have an accrediting association where the assessment
teams are from diverse traditions, it still serves as tool to bring theologians together for
conferences, and to coordinate production of a broad list of books for use in the schools,
including digital texts.
One more curious effort, was an initiative from the German Evangelical Alliance to
form such an organization in Russia. Four annual meetings have been held in Moscow, with
modest attendance, and an organizing meeting was held in Novosibirsk in the autumn of
2006. Alliance minded individuals, usually pastors, teachers and other activists, make up the
Russian Evangelical Alliance, not churches, so its influence is limited to fostering discourse.
Finally, the above impulses to alliance building do indicate a concern by Slavic Protestants
for seeking relationships at inter-church and international levels. Some scholars met at the
Baptist Seminary in Prague to consult on themes projected for Sibiu 2007, but it is striking
that Slavic Protestants have nearly disappeared from the tables of gatherings of the WCC or
Conference of European Churches.
Among those with an interest in Christians making a more organized contribution to
the building of civil society there is often a sense that better cooperation with Orthodox
leaders must be part of the effort. Yet the relationships to Orthodoxy, both at the grass roots
level, and at central leadership levels, remain more difficult than they were during the Soviet
era. Suffice it to say, that although the Evangelicals are unusually well suited to serve as
bridge between East and West, and could be a vital bridge to the church in the South as well
(since it represents the church of suffering), this is an agenda of many little projects, of slow
but persistent changes in what is taught about the other, and the more broadly discernible
changes may only come after 50 years.
5Since 1989 Religion in Eastern Europe has carried numerous articles on the moral revolution, on the
necessary elements for truth telling and social reconciliation, and on delineating a public theology.
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An American Role in Reconciliation?
To raise the question how and whether American churches (and its leaders) can be
agents of reconciliation, is a necessary one, but it is not an invitation to do an inventory of
our skills, or to launch numerous well meaning projects. CAREE may understand itself as
committed to seeking reconciliation, having attempted for nearly 50 years to bridge the East-
West barrier. But the role of American Christianity is another matter. It is crucial to recognize
that Americans are known by the Protestant flavor of their religion, and more recently the
global impact of America’s Evangelical Protestant aggressiveness has created impressions
that even many Protestants abhor. The American side in the Cold War was maintained by
apocalyptic expectations of the dire consequences of a victory by the “evil empire” (USSR),
and we (American Christianity) had given assent to threaten such evil with the ultimate
weapons of destruction. I need not remind us that the period from 1993 to the present is not a
story of nuclear disarmament; our stockpiles and readiness remain. What we have been
learning from the velvet revolutions in Europe and South Africa is that for nations to resolve
differences entails absorbing the moral dimensions of their history. It is through the recovery
of a moral memory that our nation, or our western nations, may find the political ethic, the
public theology necessary for conflict resolution.5 I offer a few more paragraphs illustrating
the kinds of acknowledgment of shortcomings, of our weakness as American Christians and
churches, where we can focus our efforts best.
One can characterize the American Christian relationship to the former USSR
between 1988 and 1996 as one of fascination with the dramatic transformations within the
former USSR. That included responding with money and projects to the widespread interest
in Bibles and in faith questions. Americans thought they could share experiences from the
positive role that religion, in its egalitarian denominational style, had played in US culture
and economics. Then came the turn away from American promises, triggered by the
financial collapse of the economies and the American inspired economic models for post-
communist reconstruction that could not withstand the pervasive corruption, but became part
of it. But it was also triggered by the impressions gained from the influx of largely
independent para-church missions, mostly of a free evangelical style, whose ignorance of
Russian history and culture and the concomitant arrogance of dismissive attitudes, shown
particularly by the Co-Mission leaders, toward existing evangelical communities, to say
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nothing of the world of Orthodoxy. That reality largely accounts for the increase of legal
restrictions on missionaries thereafter.
Over the past decade several trends help account for the current low level of inter-
church relations between American and Russian churches. The major ones include the
spreading impact of the decline of the denominational model for shaping church policy,
including its relationships abroad. Not only were the funds and staffing for ecumenical work
early casualties of cutbacks, the capacity of the National Council of Churches to put forward
a united program essentially disappeared. At the world level, between 1997 and 2002 the
World Council of Churches was shifting to use of forums of consultation instead of
commissions or committees with staff, budget and decision making powers.
The American parallel was the re-organization of NCCC and its CWS&M into
minimal staffing for essential functions and creating forums where themes and former
committees for relating to various regions of the globe were now discussed without clear
structures for policy making. Another trend was the virtual disappearance of the world of East
Europe and the former Soviet Union from the daily news, especially from the nightly
television news. Already in advance of the September 11, 2001 attack on the twin towers in
New York, American society was being told to view the threat of “terrorism” as the central
foreign policy concern, soon linking this to fear of the radical side of middle eastern Islamic
groups that now replaced fear of communist Russia as primary frame for the American’s
world view. The right wing of American Evangelicalism became focused on seeing
Armageddon come to pass in the Middle East, and its heavy funding of the new mission
initiatives in Russia and Ukraine dropped drastically.
There was also a major shift in alignments for the Evangelical denominations of
America and the former Soviet Union. The steady rise of a Christian option often noted
during the Perestroika years preceding 1988, coincided with a transformation of the character
of the largest Baptist denomination in the USA, namely the Southern Baptist Convention.
That was the takeover of all southern Baptist institutions by a fundamentalist wing,
profoundly convinced of the rightness of its grasp of Christian truth. The large SBC mission
board, always more aggressively American in its style of missionizing than was true of other
and smaller Baptist mission societies, now adopted a unilateralist approach to its foreign
mission program. For Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, it meant that long term
leaders, with linguistic capabilities and cultural sensitivities, including a substantive
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appreciation of Baptist history in Europe, left the organization and were replaced by less
experienced staff, who met the new fundamentalist criteria.
In the broad sweep I have in mind here, this resulted in the termination of major SBC
funding for the International Baptist Theological Seminary in Europe, now taken on by an
increasingly effective European Baptist Union in which East European leaders also took
leadership. The fact of that seminary’s move from near Zurich, Switzerland to Prague in the
Czech Republic, symbolized its shifting orientation, which soon became a reality. SBC
funding for denominational offices, such as that in Moscow, dropped in favor of SBC mission
initiatives in central Asia done in competition to the existing indigenous Baptist unions there.
So international trafficking of SBC and Russian Baptist leaders ended, the latter developing a
variety of partners or sponsors with other Baptist unions or groups of churches in America
and Europe. That Southern Baptist story may have been more explicitly ideological than
others, but similar patterns were at work with other Evangelical Christian and Pentecostal
alignments.
At a more optimistic level, these reflections can be seen to point to the fact that
conditions are nearly ripe for a new generation of north Americans, coming to eastern Europe
as students, as life long learners. There is enough group memory left to rebuild networks of
earlier relationships. It remains striking, evident also in recent scholarship from eastern
Europe, the degree to which the network of individuals who kept in touch through
ecumenical organizations, or through the Evangelical alliances, or student movements help
account for so many initiatives of mutual aid, and of transcending barriers to make the 20th
century the ecumenical century it was. Once a more systematic publishing initiative to make
known the work of these new scholars gets underway, it may well be that the recovery of
moral memory across national and cultural boundaries can begin to shape the public theology
deemed so necessary.
